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Mortgage performance is typically studied in terms of the 
probability or frequency of default and prepayment, a static 
characterization that does not consider the behavior of a loan before it 
terminates. Before termination, a loan can be either current or 
delinquent. A delinquency can last for only a short period of time or for 
a very long time.  
Understanding the dynamic link between delinquency and loan 
termination is important for several reasons. For example, the 
delinquency behavior of loans can impact the payment streams of 
securities with underlying mortgage collateral. In addition, regulators, 
lenders, and other secondary market participants can benefit from 
understanding the risk of termination associated with delinquent 
mortgages.  
High-risk subprime mortgages provide an ideal laboratory for 
studying the dynamic nature of mortgage performance because these 
loans tend to default and terminate at high rates (see Alexander et al. 
[2002], Pennington-Cross [2003], Cowan and Cowan [2004], and 
Capozza and Thomson [2005]). Subprime lending tends to be 
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concentrated in low-income and minority areas and in areas with 
troubled economic conditions. Subprime borrowers also tend to have 
poor credit characteristics, be less knowledgeable about the mortgage 
process, and be less satisfied with their mortgages. These are 
characteristics generally found to be consistent with trouble in meeting 
financial commitments (Pennington-Cross [2002], Calem, Cillen, and 
Wachter [2004], and Courchane, Surette, and Zorn [2004]).  
We examine the implications of delinquency for the performance 
of subprime mortgages. That is, does delinquency have any predictive 
power for the future performance of a mortgage? In addition, while it 
seems intuitively obvious that delinquency naturally leads to default, 
we also examine whether delinquency increases or reduces the 
probability that a loan will terminate through prepayment. We find 
evidence suggesting that when a loan is delinquent over a long period 
of time, prepayments dominate defaults as the primary termination.  
 
I. Motivation and Literature Review  
We examine the history of a loan until it defaults, which we 
define as entering foreclosure proceedings or becoming real estate 
owned by the lender, or until the loan is terminated through 
prepayment. Exhibit 1 provides a conceptual overview of the dynamic 
relationship between delinquency and the final outcome or termination 
of the loan.1 
In each month that a loan is alive or still active, it can be either 
current or delinquent. Loans can terminate at any time, but can 
default only after being delinquent; yet delinquency can lead to any 
other state (current, default, or prepayment). In addition, prepaid 
loans can be delinquent or current in the previous month.2  
Delinquency does play an important part in the path a loan 
takes to termination. Since a loan must necessarily be delinquent 
before default, it may seem obvious that delinquent loans must be 
more likely to default. Mitigating factors can retard the transition from 
delinquency to default, though, the most important being prepayment 
of the mortgage.  
A rational borrower may attempt to avoid the costs of 
foreclosure, which can be substantial and include legal fees besides a 
negative credit report. Negative credit reports can impact the cost of 
credit in the future. One way to avoid these costs is to sell the 
property and thus prepay the mortgage. Lenders too have incentives 
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to avoid foreclosure costs through workout arrangements with 
delinquent borrowers. Many of these workouts, such as short 
refinances, result in prepayment of the mortgage.3  
An important element to consider is that default and 
prepayment are competing risks. Increases in the probability of 
prepayment must necessarily lead to reduction in either the probability 
of continuing the mortgage or the probability of default.  
The economic motives behind prepayments in the case of a 
seriously delinquent mortgage are distinct from the traditional motives 
tor prepayment. Customary drivers of prepayments include drops in 
interest rates and trigger events such as job loss or divorce. 
Prepayments of delinquent mortgages, however, can be viewed as 
distressed prepayments brought about by borrower or lender desire to 
avoid a default.  
The current equity status of the property is a key determinant of 
whether a delinquent mortgage will prepay or will default. From the 
borrower's perspective, a positive equity position makes the borrower 
more likely to attempt to preserve such a position by selling rather 
than letting the property go into foreclosure. From the lenders 
perspective, the opposite is true in the case of a property with positive 
equity. If the borrower does not want to sell the house, the least costly 
alternative may be to foreclose, sell, and use the proceeds to satisfy 
the debt. The net impact of current equity on defaults and 
prepayments is thus an open empirical question.  
There is no reason to assume that the relationship between 
delinquency and default is linear. For example, Ambrose, Buttimer, 
and Capone [1997] identify three benefits to delinquency, namely, free 
rent, income smoothing, and time to cure or the value of delay.  
Free rent is received during delinquency because the mortgage 
is not being paid in a timely Hishion. Borrowers can also not pay their 
mortgages in an attempt to maintain a standard of living beyond 
current income streams. This may make most sense for those with 
highly variable income sources or anticipated permanent increases in 
income in the near future. Lastly, delinquency by its nature entails a 
period of delay, and delaying can be valuable because it can buy time 
to solve the problem. House prices may rise dramatically or the 
borrower may solve the liquidity problem through a change in job 
status, seasonal income streams, or improved credit availability. Kau 
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and Kim [1994] discuss the value of delay and the role of house price 
volatility in an options theory framework.  
Borrowers face significant costs while being delinquent. Late 
fees accrue over time, making it cost more in the long run to cure the 
loan. In addition, the delinquency is reported to credit agencies, which 
can have long-term and dramatic impacts on a household. The cost of 
credit will increase; the availability of credit will lessen; and new 
positions may be threatened due to credit and background checks. 
There are significant costs to default that could make prepayment a 
more attractive option.  
Given that delinquency can precede almost any outcome, it is an 
empirical question as to whether it leads to more defaults, 
prepayments, or just more delinquency. To examine the influence of 
delinquency on the future performance of a mortgage, we need to 
understand the forces that influence the probability a loan will be 
delinquent and the intensity of the delinquency. Empirical research 
over the last 30 years has addressed many of the same drivers.  
For example, von Furstenberg and Green [1974] and Morton 
[1975] find that the loan to value (LTV) ratio at origination and the 
income of the borrower play important roles in mortgage delinquency. 
Getter [2003] complements these findings by using the 1998 Survey 
of Consumer Finances to show that borrowers use other non-housing 
financial assets to help make payments during unexpected periods of 
financial stress. Chinloy [1995] finds in the United Kingdom during the 
period 1983 through 1992 that LTV and income are the primary 
covariates associated with delinquency. Other researchers also find 
that credit scores, contemporaneous economic conditions, and the 
incentive structure of the lender all can impact delinquency (Baku and 
Smith [1998), Caleni and Wachter [1999], Ambrose and Capone 
[2000].4  
Ambrose and Capone [1996, 2000] have shown empirically that 
the behavior of a loan in the past can help to predict its behavior in 
the future. They find that the length of the first serious delinquency 
(defined as time spent 90 or more days delinquent) reduces the 
probability of a second period of serious delinquency (90 days- plus 
delinquent). In addition, if the loan enters serious delinquency tor a 
second time, it is less likely to be reinstated. These results provide 
empirical evidence that die current status of a mortgage is not 
independent of its status in previous months. 
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We extend this literature by jointly estimating the probability of 
being delinquent with the intensity of delinquency measured by the 
cumulative delinquency rate. We also estimate the impact of the 
predicted probability' and predicted intensity of delinquency on the 
probability of default and prepayment in the second step of the 
estimation. This approach lets us observe and test for the dynamic and 
non-linear nature of mortgage behavior.5  
 
II. Econometric Model  
A mortgage's status is the result of joint decisions by the 
borrower and the lender. The current status—prepaid, defaulted, or 
continuing—is influenced by the cumulative payment history. Because 
a mortgage's current outcome is not independent of the previous 
monthly outcomes, we use a Heckman two-step procedure to control 
for the endogeneity. We specifically focus on the impact of past 
delinquency on the current outcome.  
In the first step, we estimate the intensity of delinquency, 
defined as the fraction oi the observed life of the loan that it is 
delinquent. In the second step, we estimate a seemingly unrelated 
bivariate probit model of mortgage outcomes and include the predicted 
intensity of delinquency and predicted delinquency probability from the 
first step.  
In the first step of our model, we estimate a double-hurdle Tobit 
model (Cragg's model) of the intensity' of delinquency because the 
majority of mortgages have zero incidence of delinquency. The double-
hurdle Tobit model separately models the probability of experiencing a 
delinquency and the intensity. Specifically, let the first hurdle be 




where  is an unobserved measure of the propensity of a mortgage i 
to be delinquent, zi is a vector of borrower and loan characteristics, α 
is a vector of parameters to be estimated, and εi~N(0,1). Define a 
dummy variable, di, as:  
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where yi is the fraction of the observed life of mortgage i that is 
delinquent or the intensity of delinquency, xi is a vector of borrower 
and loan characteristics, β is a vector of parameters to be estimated, 
and ui~N(0,σ2).  
It is important to note that ε and u are assumed independent. 
By this we mean that unobserved factors that cause a mortgage to be 
potentially delinquent are uncorrelated with the unobserved factors 
that determine the fraction of the observed life that the mortgage is 
actually delinquent.  




where Σ0 denotes the summation over observations with zero 
delinquency, Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function, Σ+ 
denotes the summation over observations with a positive delinquency 
rate, and Φ denotes the standard normal density function. The log-
likelihood function is maximized by choosing the unknown parameters 
α, β, and σ.  
The predicted value of intensity can be calculated using the 
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Intuitively, ̂γ equals the probability of delinquency multiplied by 
the expected value of the delinquency ratio, conditional on a 
delinquency rate greater than zero.  
The second stage of the estimation uses the predicted value of 
the intensity of delinquency in a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit 
model of the mortgage outcome. Specifically, we jointly model the 
probability of default and the probability of prepayment of a 
mortgage.6  
The model specification is given by  
 





   (8) 
 
Equation (7) models the probability of default and prepayment of 
mortgage  and , respectively) as a function of loan and 
borrower characteristics, wi, including the predicted intensity of 
delinquency, and unknown parameters δ. The error terms εi have a 
correlation coefficient equal to ρ.  
The log-likelihood function for the seemingly unrelated bivariate 




where Φ2 denotes the standard bivariate normal cumulative density 
function. The function is maximized by choosing the parameters δd, δd, 
and ρ.7  
Following Murphy and Topel [1985], we correct the variance-
covariance matrix of the bivariate probit model to account for the 
inclusion of estimated variables as regressors. We follow a procedure 
outlined in Hardin [2002] to accomplish the correction using the 
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statistical package STATA. The standard errors exhibit very little 
change as a result of the correction.8  
 
III. Data  
We draw our sample of loans for the estimation from a dataset 
consisting of the performance history of the underlying collateral of 
pools of private-label subprime securitizations available from 
Loanperformance (LP). Only 30-year fixed-rate loans for home 
purchase in metropolitan areas are included. The LP database provides 
information on the loan at origination, including property location, LTV, 
credit score (FICO), and documentation and prepayment penalty 
status. The database also includes pool-level information on the 
provider of the data to LP, as well as monthly information on the age 
and the status of the loan (current, defaulted, prepaid, or delinquent).  
A cross-section of 22,799 loans from January 1996 through May 
2003 is selected from the LP database. For each loan, we randomly 
pick one month in the performance history and compute the intensity 
of delinquency to that point. This is the fraction of the observed life of 
the loan that is delinquent. For example, 0 indicates that the loan has 
never been delinquent, 0.5 indicates that the loan has been delinquent 
one-half of the time, and 1 indicates that the loan has always been 
delinquent.  
External data from a number of sources are matched to the 
sample. We use the metropolitan area repeat sales House Price Index 
from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight and the 
balance of the loan to calculate a current loan-to-value ratio. We 
match the contemporaneous metropolitan area unemployment rate 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to the loan. We also compute the 
change in the prevailing prime interest rate from the date of loan 
origination to the current date using Freddie Mac's Primary Mortgage 
Market Survey as a measure of the change in interest rates affecting 
the refinancing incentive.  
A more detailed description of the variables used in the 
estimation is in Exhibit 2. Exhibit 3 provides summary statistics for the 
data.  
Identification is achieved in the model using a theory-based 
specification approach. The double-hurdle model and the bivariate 
probit model include a common set of covariates such as age of the 
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loan and FICO that are chosen on the basis of their theoretical 
relationship.  
One variable, a low documentation binary, is included in the 
double-hurdle model of cumulative delinquency but not in the bivariate 
model of default and pre-payment. Low documentation loans are 
typically used by borrowers with lumpy income streams such as small 
business owners. Because of the uneven income streams of these 
borrowers, we would expect to see higher rates of missed payments, 
but we would not expect to see differing levels of loan termination 
based on uneven income streams.  
Two variables, the change in interest rates and a prepayment 
penalty binary, are included in the bivariate probit model only.9 
Interest rate changes are theorized to affect prepayments through the 
refinance incentive and to affect defaults through the option theory of 
mortgages.9  
 
IV. Results  
Exhibit 4 presents the results of the first step of the estimation, 
the double-hurdle Tobit model. The first column reports the results 
from estimation of the first hurdle [the α vector in Equation (1)], the 
probability of delinquency, and the second column reports the results 
from estimation of the second hurdle [the β vector in Equation (3)], 
the intensity of delinquency. Exhibit 5 reports the results of the second 
step of the estimation, the seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model 
[the δd and δp vectors in Equation (7)].  
Because many of the independent variables enter into both the 
first and the second stages of the estimation, interpretation of the 
coefficients is not straightforward. For instance, FICO affects the 
predicted cumulative delinquency frequency by affecting the 
probability of delinquency as well the level of delinquency, conditional 
on being delinquent. The predicted intensity of delinquency and the 
predicted probability of delinquency then affect the probability of 
default and the probability of prepayment in the seemingly unrelated 
bivariate probit model.  
In the second step, then, FICO has an indirect effect on the 
probability of default and prepayment through its impact on predicted 
delinquency probability- and intensity of delinquency, and a direct 
effect through inclusion of a FICO variable.  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Fixed Income, Vol. 15, No. 1 (June 2005): pg. 28-39. DOI. This article is © Institutional Investor, Inc. and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Institutional Investor, Inc. does not 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Institutional Investor, Inc. 
10 
 
Exhibit 6 graphs this relationship and the way FICO ultimately 
affects default and prepayment probabilities. To interpret the 
coefficients, we graph the estimated probability of default and 
prepayment over the range of observed values for each of the 
continuous independent variables, holding all other variables at their 
means. For the discrete independent variables, we calculate the 
percentage change in the estimated probabilities as the variable 
moves from 0 to 1.  
The past delinquency behavior of a loan is strongly positively 
related to the probability of default and prepayment, as shown in 
Exhibit 7. This is the direct effect oi the intensity' of delinquency, and 
does not incorporate the indirect effects of variables that caused the 
delinquency to change in the first place.  
As one would expect, as a loan increases in the intensity of 
delinquency, there is a higher probability that the loan defaults. There 
is a peak in defaults at 6.3% when the intensity is 0.72 and a slight 
decline thereafter.  
Somewhat surprising is the strength of the impact of past 
delinquency behavior on prepayments. At an intensity of delinquency 
of 0.72, the probability of prepayment is 26.3%. This is a strong 
indicator of distressed prepayments.  
One important finding is that delinquency in the subprime 
market tends to lead to prepayments more than defaults. Prepayments 
increase more quickly than defaults as the intensity of delinquency 
increases. The odds ratios for default and prepayment are 3.82 for 
default and 5.89 for prepayment as the intensity of delinquency 
increases from 2% to 72%.  
As a result, while prepayments are almost always more likely, 
they are even more prevalent when a loan has been delinquent most 
of its observed life. Prepayments are 2.93 times more likely when we 
should see very few defaults (intensity of delinquency = 0.02), and 
prepayments are 4.16 times more likely when distressed prepayments 
are very likely (intensity of delinquency = 0.72). These results provide 
evidence that distressed prepayments rise rapidly, and even more 
than defaults, in response to extended periods of delinquency.  
Exhibits 8A and 8B reflect the marginal effects of LTV at 
origination and current LTV on our first- and second-stage estimates. 
The two graphs are practically mirror images. While the origination 
LTV results reflect the impact of subprime underwriting requirements 
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that higher LTV loans must have compensating factors, the marginal 
effects of current LTV support the ruthless default theory of borrower 
behavior.  
As current LTV crosses the threshold of 100, the probability of 
default increases exponentially. At an LTV of 100, the probability' of 
default is 6.8%, rising to 25.9% as LTV climbs to 120. When current 
LTV is in excess of 100, the value of the property is less than the 
mortgage outstanding, leading to a ruthless default on the mortgage in 
an option-theoretic framework.10  
We also find that prepayments are negatively related to the 
current LTV. This is consistent with the limited options of a borrower in 
a severe negative equity option.  
Further evidence of distressed prepayments appears in Exhibits 
9A and 9B. Delinquent borrowers with positive equity in their property, 
evidenced by low current LTV, prepay with greater probability than 
delinquent borrowers without equity. This appears to be a rational 
response for borrowers who are weighing selling their property and 
preserving equity compared to borrowers without equity to protect. 
Delinquent borrowers with positive equity rarely default, while 
delinquent borrowers without equity default at much higher 
probabilities. This suggests that, although lenders have incentives to 
foreclose on properties with positive equity, borrowers are prepaying 
in advance of that possibility.11  
Credit scores play an important role in determining the 
probabilities of prepayment and default both directly and indirectly. 
Exhibit 10 shows the effects of FICO on the probability of delinquency 
and the intensity of delinquency Borrowers with low credit scores are 
delinquent with a 25% probability, and these loans are predicted to be 
delinquent nearly 20% of their lifetime. Borrowers with credit scores of 
750, however, are delinquent with a 3% probability, and their loans 
will spend just 0.65% of their lives in delinquency.  
The combined indirect and direct impact of FICO on default and 
prepayment is shown in Exhibit 11. At levels of FICO below 570, the 
probability of default is greater than the probability of prepayment. As 
expected, defaults decline with FICO, indicating that performance with 
regard to past financial obligations is a good predictor of current 
performance. We also find that prepayments increase with credit 
score. This may be an indication that borrowers with high credit scores 
are able to cure into prime mortgages.  
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Exhibit 1 2 reflects the percentage change in our four estimates 
of interest as each of the continuous independent variables are 
increased by one standard deviation, holding all other variables at 
their means. The impacts on the probability' of delinquency, the 
intensity of delinquency, the probability of default, and the probability 
of prepayment are shown.  
Rising credit scores reduce the probability of delinquency and 
the intensity of delinquency. An increase in FICO by one standard 
deviation cuts the probability of default by nearly one-half, while the 
probability of prepayment increases by nearly one-quarter.  
As would be expected, the probability of prepayment is 
negatively related to changes in interest rates over the life of the loan. 
Exhibit 13 reports this evidence. Prepayment and (to a lesser extent) 
default probabilities decline as interest rates rise. This is consistent 
with the refinancing incentive for prepayment.  
The area unemployment rate, included as a proxy for trigger 
events, has very little impact on our estimated variables. Rising 
unemployment rates would be theorized to increase delinquency and 
default probabilities as they potentially increase the financial distress 
of these borrowers, but we do not find this relationship using the 
previous month’s metropolitan area unemployment rate as an 
indication of trigger events.  
Exhibit 14 shows the percentage change in the discrete 
independent variables as the variable switches from 0 to 1. The first 
row reflects the impact of low documentation (LD) on a loan's 
performance. Low doc increases the probability of delinquency and the 
intensity of delinquency, but slightly reduces the probabilities of 
default and prepayment.  
The second row shows the impact of prepayment penalties. The 
presence of a prepayment penalty reduces the probability of 
prepayment by one-half.  
The next series of variables in Exhibit 14 represent the fixed 
effects of MIC_group. MIC_group is a variable in the pool-level 
Loanperformance data indicating the source of the data (the data 
provider). Data providers include lenders and servicers in the subprime 
market. The coefficients can therefore reflect many different sources of 
heterogeneity in the subprime market derived from origination, 
underwriting of the pools of loans, owners of the securities, and 
servicing.  
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The results are significant and substantial in all the estimates. 
Tests of interaction of the MIC_group with delinquency and credit 
scores proved to be untruthful.  
 
V. Conclusion  
The emergence of subprime lending has created many 
challenges in the marketplace. With the high, and sometimes 
unexpectedly high, termination rates of subprime loans, one challenge 
is to come to a more complete understanding of how mortgages 
terminate. For example, are there paths to termination that indicate 
whether a loan will ultimately default or prepay?  
The evidence is that the long-run delinquency of a loan leads to 
elevated probabilities of prepayment and default, with a more 
pronounced response in terms of prepayment. These prepayments are 
made when a loan is delinquent and are independent of interest rates; 
as a consequence, we interpret these types of prepayments as 
distressed prepayments. These results cannot be consistent with credit 
curing refinances {improving a credit history through time), because 
delinquency worsens not improves credit history. Our results therefore 
provide an alternative interpretation for the observed high rate of out-
of-the-money prepayments of subprime loans, which is consistent with 
further credit deterioration.  
Finally, the relationship between the extent or intensity of 
delinquency and default is non-linear. In fact, if a loan spends most of 
its life in delinquency, this actually implies a lower probability of 
default. These results are consistent with motivations such as free 
rent, income smoothing, and the value of delay.  
 
Disclaimer  
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, 
disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any 
of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the 
author's colleagues upon the staff of the Commission.  
The views expressed in this research are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, and the Board 
of Governors.  
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1. We also examine loans that do not terminate to account for all 
possible states.  
2. Note that loans that arc in foreclosure proceedings have not fully 
terminated. In fact, a portion of these loans can be reinstated, 
prepaid, or modified (terms extended or other alterations made 
to reduce monthly payments), or experience other alternative 
outcomes. Researchers who examine these issues include 
Weagley [1988], Lawrence and Arshadi [1995], Ambrose and 
Capone [1996, 1998], Phillips and Rosenblatt [1997], Geppert 
and Karels [2001], Wang, Young, and Zhou [2002], and 
Lambrecht, Perraudin, and Satchell [2003].  
3. In a short refinance, the lender forgives a portion of the debt and 
allows the borrower to restructure the delinquent mortgage into 
a new mortgage with a lower principal balance.  
4. Industry reports have also examined the delinquency of mortgages. 
For example, Gjaja and Wang [2004] examine transition 
matrices of subprime loans for a single servicer.  
5. Recall that default is defined as the beginning of foreclosure 
proceedings.  
6. The probability of the third possible outcome, a mortgage 
continuing, equals one minus the probability of default minus 
the probability of prepayment.  
7. As indicated in Greene [2000], multivariate probit allows the error 
terms to be correlated and thus relaxes the independence 
assumption of the multinomial logit. The assumption of a normal 
error term instead of logistic is also consistent with the first-
stage error assumptions. In addition, in a J-dimensional problem 
J-1 probabilities must be considered. Therefore, in our case, 
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where θ1 and θ1 are vectors of all estimated parameters, we 
account for the inclusion of the predicted intensity of 
delinquency variable, Dq, only.  
 
9. The prepayment penalty indicator variable is included in the prepay 
specification only.  
10. The impact of an increase in current LTV by one standard deviation 
elasticity on the probability of default is 316%. See Exhibit 5.  
11. Lenders also can allow short sales (sales price < outstanding 
balance) to avoid the costs of foreclosure.  
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Exhibit 2: Description of Variables and Source 
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Exhibit 3: Summary Statistics for Estimation Data Set 
 
Dq is the intensity of delinquency. Dp indicates when the loan is delinquent. d indicates 
the loan has defaulted. p indicates the loan has prepaid. A is age. L is the origination 
loan-to-value ratio. Lc is the current loan-to-value ratio. F is the FICO score. U is last 
month’s unemployment rate. LD is a low or no documentation loan. ΔI is the 
cumulative change in interest rates since origination. P is the prepay penalty if in force 
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Exhibit 4: Double-Hurdle Results 
 
All variables are transformed so that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is 1. 
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Exhibit 5: Seemingly Unrelated Bivariate Probit Results 
 
All variables, including the dummy variables, are transformed so that the mean is zero 
and the standard deviation is 1. The excluded data provider is the Residential Funding 
Corporation, which includes both RFC Home Equity and RFC Master. 
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Exhibit 8B: Effect of Current LTV on First- and Second-Stage 
Estimates 
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Exhibit 9A: Predicted Probability of Prepayment for Various Current 
Equity Positions and Intensity of Delinquency 
 
 
Exhibit 9B: Predicted Probability of Default for Various Current Equity 
Positions and Intensity of Delinquency 
 
* Direct effect only. Low and high are defined as a one standard deviation above and 
below the mean. 
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Exhibit 10: Effect of FICO on Delinquency 
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Exhibit 12: One Standard Deviation Elasticity 
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Exhibit 14: Fixed and Discontinuous Effects—Percent Change 
 
 
